CONSTITUTIONAL

LAW-ELEVENTH
AMENDMENT-STATES'
IMMUNITY FROM MONETARY JUDGMENTS UNDER THE BANK-

RUPTCY CODE-Hoffman v. Connecticut Department of Income
Maintenance, 109 S. Ct. 2818 (1989).
The eleventh amendment to the United States Constitution
provides that "[t]he Judicial power of the United States shall not
be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced
or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State."'
Since its ratification in 1798,2 the eleventh amendment has been
construed both broadly and narrowly.3 Some commentators argue that the eleventh amendment only limits federal jurisdiction
in suits brought against nonconsenting states based exclusively
on diversity of state-citizenship jurisdiction.4 Others, in support
of state immunity, contend that the eleventh amendment bars all
suits brought against nonconsenting states by citizens seeking
monetary relief.5 As part of that debate, the United States
I U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
2 Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 286 (1985) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting) (President Adams certified the eleventh amendment's ratification four
years after the resolution was announced).
3 Brown, State Sovereignty Under the Burger Court-How the Eleventh Amendment Survived the Death of the Tenth: Some BroaderImplications of Atascadero State Hospitalv. ScanIon, 74 GEO. L. J. 363, 366 (1985) [hereinafter Brown, State Sovereignty Under the
Burger Court] (the amendment might be seen as narrowly drafted, yet the Court has
returned to a broader principle of state immunity).
4 Fletcher, A HistoricalInterpretationof the Eleventh Amendment: A Narrow Construction of an Affirmative Grant ofJurisdictionRather than a ProhibitionAgainst Jurisdiction,35
STAN. L. REV. 1033, 1060 (1983) [hereinafter Fletcher, A HistoricalInterpretationof the
Eleventh Amendment] (eleventh amendment bars diversity suits, not federal question
suits); Gibbons, The Eleventh Amendment and State Sovereign Immunity: A Reinterpretation,
83 COLUM. L. REV. 1889, 2004 (1983) [hereinafter Gibbons, Eleventh Amendment and
State Sovereign Immunity] (eleventh amendment should be strictly construed).
Diversity of state-citizenship jurisdiction refers to party-based jurisdiction
based on the citizenship of the parties without regard to the subject matter of the
case. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1 ("The judicial Power shall extend . . . to
Controversies . . . between citizens of different States.
); see also 28 U.S.C.
§ 1332 (a)(l) (1988).
Federal question jurisdiction is established based on the subject matter of the
case irrespective of the parties' characteristics. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1
("The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this
Constitution, the Law of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be
made, under their authority ....
); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1988) ("The district
courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States").
5 Brown, State Sovereignty Under the Burger Court, supra note 3 at 363 ("viewing the
eleventh amendment as an embodiment of state sovereignty principles is the most
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Supreme Court has struggled to determine whether the eleventh
amendment limits the authority of a bankruptcy court to subject a
state to monetary judgments.6
In Hoffman v. Connecticut Department of Income Maintenance, the
Court considered whether section 106(c) of the Bankruptcy
Code 7 allows a state, that has failed to file a proof of claim' in a
Chapter 7 proceeding, to be exposed to a monetary judgment
levied against it by a bankruptcy court.9 In finding that a bankruptcy court lacks the power to abrogate eleventh amendment
immunity, the Court required that the Bankruptcy Code evince
an unmistakably clear expression of congressional intent to nesatisfactory means ofjustifying the elaborate jurisprudence it has generated"); Marshall, The Diversity Theory of the Eleventh Amendment: A CriticalEvaluation, 102 HARV. L.
REV. 1372, 1396 (1989) [hereinafter Marshall, The Diversity Theory] (based on historical understanding and current jurisprudence, appropriate to consider eleventh
amendment as excluding suits for monetary relief brought in federal court by private citizen against state).
6 See Hoffman v. Conn. Dep't of Income Maintenance, 109 S. Ct. 2818 (1989).
7 Id. at 2821 (White, J., plurality opinion). Hoffman brought suit under § 106
asserting that § 106(c) abrogates a state 's eleventh amendment immunity when a
state fails to file a proof of claim. Sections 106(a) and (b) waive states' sovereign
immunity when states file a proof of claim and the claim is limited to counter-claims
and setoffs. Section 106(c) subjects "governmental units" to the provisions of the
Bankruptcy Code triggered by the words contained in § 106(c)(1). The Hoffman
Court therefore considered whether § 106(c) subjects states to monetary judgments by acting as a waiver of sovereign immunity. See 11 U.S.C. § 106 (1988).
Section 106 of the Bankruptcy Code provides that:
(a) A governmental unit is deemed to have waived sovereign immunity with respect to any claim against such governmental unit that is
property of the estate and that arose out of the same transaction or
occurrence out of which such governmental unit's claim arose.
(b) There shall be offset against an allowed claim or interest of a governmental unit any claim against such governmental unit that is property of the estate.
(c) Except as provided in subsections (a) and (b) of this section and
notwithstanding any assertion of sovereign immunity(1) a provision of this title that contains "creditor", "entity", or
"governmental unit" applies to governmental units; and
(2) a determination by the court of an issue arising under such a
provision binds governmental units.
Id.
8 Hoffman, 109 S. Ct. at 2821 (White, J., plurality opinion). A proof of claim
consists of a written statement filed under oath which sufficiently sets forth a creditor's claim. 11 U.S.C. Rule 3001 (1988).
9 Hoffman, 109 S.Ct. at 2821 (White, J., plurality opinion). There are two types
of proceedings in bankruptcy: liquidation and reorganization. A Chapter 7 proceeding provides for the liquidation of the debtor's assets. 11 U.S.C. §§ 701-766.
Both Chapter 11 and 13 proceedings provide the debtor with an opportunity to
reorganize and rehabilitate its assets. 11 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1174 (1988); 11 U.S.C.
§§ 1301-1334 (1988).

SETON HALL LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 21:88

gate the states' eleventh amendment immunity.'0 Thus, in Hoffman, the Court'held that section 106(c) of the Bankruptcy Code
does not abrogate the states' sovereign immunity; hence, no state
will be subject to monetary claims in a Chapter 7 proceeding."
Martin W. Hoffman, the trustee in bankruptcy for Willington
Convalescent Home, Inc. (Willington) and Edward Zera instituted two separate Chapter 7 proceedings in the United States
Bankruptcy Court for the District of Connecticut.' 2 Hoffman instituted a "turnover" proceeding on behalf of Willington under
section 542(b) of the Bankruptcy Code'" in order to recover
money due for services rendered.' 4 In the second proceeding,
Hoffman sought to recover taxes paid by Zera one month prior to
filing for bankruptcy on the theory that such taxes constituted a
voidable preference under section 547(b) of the Bankruptcy
Code.1 5 The State of Connecticut did not file a proof of claim in
1o Hoffman, 109 S. Ct. at 2822 (White, J., plurality opinion), citing Atascadero
State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234 (1985). See also infra notes 73-82 and accompanying text; Dellmuth v. Muth, 109 S. Ct. 2397 (1989) infra notes 103-09 and
accompanying text; Welch v. Texas Dep't of Highways and Pub. Transp., 107 U.S.
2941 (1987) infra notes 85-102 and accompanying text.
I' Hoffman, 109 S. Ct. at 2824 (White, J., plurality opinion). In so doing, the
Court left open the question of whether Congress under its Bankruptcy power, is
empowered to abrogate states' eleventh amendment immunity by legislative enactment. Id. Cases dealing with congressional abrogation of sovereign immunity involve a two prong inquiry: (1) whether Congress has the power to abrogate
eleventh amendment immunity, and (2) whether Congress intended to abrogate
sovereign immunity. Parden v. Terminal Ry. Co., 377 U.S. 184, 187 (1964). See
infra notes 53-61 and accompanying text.
12 Hoffman, 109 S. Ct. at 2821 (White, J., plurality opinion).
'3 Id. A turnover proceeding requires that upon filing for bankruptcy, an entity
that owes the debtor money must pay the trustee unless such money owed can be
offset by a debt owed to the entity/creditor by the same debtor. See 11 U.S.C.
§ 542(b) (1988). Section 542(b) states:
[A]n entity that owes a debt that is property of the estate and that is
matured, payable on demand, or payable on order, shall pay such
debt to, or on the order of, the trustee, except to the extent that such
debt may be offset under section 553 of this title against a claim
against the debtor.
Id. The exception provided for under § 553 preserves the right to offset a debt
with a claim against a creditor in a bankruptcy action. See 11 U.S.C. § 553 (1988).
14 Hoffman, 109 S. Ct. at 2821 (White, J., plurality opinion). In March 1983,
Willington had performed services valued at $64,010.24 pursuant to its Medicaid
contract with the State of Connecticut. Id. One month later, Willington ceased
operations. Id. When it closed its doors, Willington owed the Connecticut Department of Income Maintenance $121,408.00 for excessive Medicaid payments that
the state made during the course of Willington's business. Id. Willington, therefore, owed the state a net amount of $57,397.76. See id.
15 Id. The Connecticut Department of Revenue Service compelled Zera to pay
outstanding taxes, penalties, and interest of $2100.62 one month before he filed for
bankruptcy. Id.; see 11 U.S.C. § 547(b) (1988). Section 547(b) provides that if the
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either proceeding.' 6
The State of Connecticut, instead, asserted that the eleventh
17
amendment barred Hoffman's actions and moved to dismiss.
The bankruptcy court denied both motions.' The court reasoned that section 106(c) of the Bankruptcy Code evidences an
"unmistakably clear intent" by Congress to abrogate states' sovereign immunity.' 9 States, therefore, are immune from actions
under sections 542(b) and 547(b) of the Bankruptcy Code.2 0
Further, the bankruptcy court stated that Congress had the
power to limit sovereign immunity pursuant to the bankruptcy
clause of Article I of the United States Constitution.2 '
On appeal to the United States District Court for the District
of Connecticut, the United States intervened because of the conrequisite criteria are met "[T]he trustee may avoid any transfer of an interest of the
Id. The five criteria of a preference action are as follows:
debtor in property ....
(1) the transfer must benefit a creditor; (2) the transfer must involve the payment of
the debtor's antecedent debt owed before the transfer was made; (3) the debtor
must have been insolvent when the transfer was made; (4) the transfer must have
occurred within 90 days of the debtor's filing for bankruptcy; and (5) the transfer
must have allowed the creditor to receive more than he would have if the transfer
had not been made. Id.
16 Hoffman, 109 S. Ct. at 2821 (White, J., plurality opinion). It must be noted
that because no proof of claim was filed, § 106(a) and (b) were not triggered. Hoffman relied on § 106(c) of the Bankruptcy Code which does not require the filing of
a proof of claim. Id. at 2822 (White, J., plurality opinion). See I U.S.C. § 106
(1988) supra note 7.
17 Matter of Willington Convalescent Home, Inc., 39 B.R. 781, 792 (Bankr. D.
Conn. 1984); Matter of Zera, No. 2-83-00754, slip op. at 14 (Bankr. D. Conn. June
8, 1984); Matter of Willington Convalescent Home, Inc., 39 B.R. 781 (Bankr. D.
Conn. 1984), mot. denied; rev'd, mot. dismiss granted, In re Willington Convalescent Home, Inc., 72 B.R. 1002 (D. Conn. 1987), aff'd, 850 F.2d 50 (2d Cir. 1988),
cert. granted, 109 S. Ct. 781 (1989), aff'd sub nom. Hoffman v. Conn. Dep't of Income
Maintenance, 109 S. Ct. 2818 (1989); Matter of Zera, No. 2-83-00754, slip op.
(Bankr. D. Conn. June 8, 1984), mot. denied; rev'd, mot. dismiss granted, In re Zera,
72 B.R. 997 (D. Conn. 1987), aff'd sub nom., In re Willington Convalescent Home,
Inc., 850 F.2d 50 (2d Cir. 1988), cert. granted, 109 S. Ct. 781 (1989), aff'd sub nom.
Hoffman v. Conn. Dep't of Income Maintenance, 109 S. Ct. 2818 (1989). The State
of Connecticut had two choices at the beginning of each of these suits. The State
could have filed a proof of claim which functions as a constructive waiver of eleventh amendment immunity, or, the state could file a motion to dismiss on the
grounds that the eleventh amendment bars such actions against the state. See supra
note 7.
18

Id.

19 Willington, 39 B.R. at 786-88; Zera, slip op. at 11-14.

Id.
Willington, 39 B.R. at 789-91; Zera, slip op. at 11. The bankruptcy clause of the
United States Constitution conveys to Congress the power "[t]o establish an uniform Rule of Naturalization, and uniform Laws on the subject of bankruptcies
throughout the United States." U.S. CONST. art. I § 8, cl. 4.
20
21

92
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stitutional challenge to section 106 of the Bankruptcy Code.2 2
The district court reversed the bankruptcy court's decision and
held that section 106(c) does not clearly abrogate a state's eleventh amendment immunity. 5
The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
affirmed the district court's holding. 24 In so doing, the court of
appeals reiterated that the language of section 106(c) does not
25
expressly abrogate eleventh amendment immunity.
Noting a conflict among the Second, 6 Third 7 and Seventh28
Circuit Courts of Appeals, the United States Supreme Court
22 In re Willington Convalescent Home, Inc., 72 B.R. 1002, 1012 (D. Conn.
1987); In re Zera, 72 B.R. 997, 1002 (D. Conn. 1987), aff'd, In re Willington Convalescent Home, Inc., 850 F.2d 50 (1988), cert. granted, 109 S. Ct. 781 (1989), affd sub
nom. Hoffman v. Conn. Dept. of Income Maintenance, 109 S. Ct. 2818 (1989).
23 In re Willington Convalescent Home, Inc., 72 B.R. at 1012; In re Zera, 72 B.R.
at 1001-02.
24 In re Willington Convalescent Home, Inc., 850 F.2d 50, 56-57 (1988), cert.
granted, 109 S. Ct. 781 (1989), aff'd sub nom. Hoffman v. Conn. Dep't of Income
Maintenance, 109 S. Ct. 2818 (1989).
25 Id. at 56-57. The court of appeals did, however, state that § 106(c) nullifies
sovereign immunity only to allow for a determination of a state's interest in the
debtor's estate. Id. at 55. The court analyzed the language of § 106(c) in two steps.
First, the court noted that the introductory words ("except as provided in") of
§ 106(c) must be read independently of § (a) and (b). Id. at 54. The court, therefore, determined that while § (a) and (b) are only triggered when a state files a
claim against the estate of the debtor, the application of § (c) is not confined by
such a requirement. Id. Next, the court of appeals distinguished between the use
of the words "any claim" in § 106(a) and (b) and the words "determination" of an
"issue" in § 106(c)(2). Id. at 54. The court asserted that "claims" are more indicative of monetary relief, whereas, "issues" suggest declaratory or injunctive relief.
Id. at 54. Sections (a) and (b) waive sovereign immunity to provide for monetary
judgments against the state when a proof of claim is filed. Section (c), on the other
hand, waives sovereign immunity to allow declaratory and injunctive relief when
actions are brought under a provision having one of the "triggering" words. Id. at
55. The court of appeals held that § 106(c) does not authorize monetary recovery
from a state in an action brought pursuant to § 542(b) or 547(b) of the Bankruptcy
Code. Id. at 57.
It is interesting to note that the court of appeals was willing to consider the
legislative history of § 106(c) in its analysis. Id. at 55-56. After considering the
legislative history of § 106 however, the court determined that congressional intent
to abrogate sovereign immunity was ambiguous. Id. at 57. Such ambiguities, in the
court's view, should be resolved in favor of the state. Id.
26 Id.
27 Vazquez v. Pennsylvania Dep't of Pub. Welfare, 788 F.2d 130 (3d Cir. 1986),
cert. denied, 479 U.S. 936 (broadly interpreted § 106(c) and rejected Pennsylvania's
assertion of sovereign immunity when determining dischargeability of debts).
28 McVey Trucking, Inc. v. Secretary of State of Illinois, 812 F.2d 311 (7th Cir.
1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 895 (1987) (section 106(c) negates states' sovereign
immunity in federal court action for monetary relief under § 547(b) of the Bankruptcy Code).
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The Court held that section 106(c) does not

abrogate a state's eleventh amendment immunity. 30 The eleventh amendment, therefore, barred Hoffman's actions under sections 542(b) and 547(b) of the Bankruptcy Code.3 '
There is little dispute that the eleventh amendment was specifically enacted to overrule Chisholm v. Georgia.32 In Chisholm, the
executor of a South Carolina estate, brought a breach of contract
action in federal court against the State of Georgia to recover a
debt for war supplies purchased in 1777.3 Georgia argued that
the United States Supreme Court could not establish jurisdiction
over the action because the state, in asserting sovereign immunity, could not be compelled to cooperate with the Court.3 4 Cit-

ing its article III power, the Court held that the State of Georgia
could be sued in federal court by a citizen of South Carolina.35
The Court reasoned that notwithstanding Georgia's assertion of
sovereign immunity, federal jurisdiction could be established
based on diversity of state-citizenship.36
37
Congressional reaction to Chisholm was "swift and hostile.
The eleventh amendment was immediately proposed, overwhelmingly passed by Congress, and quickly ratified by the
29 Hoffman v. Conn. Dep't of Maintenance, 109 S. Ct. 781 (1989).
30 Hoffman v. Conn. Dep't of Income Maintenance, 109 S. Ct. 2818, 2824

(1989) (White, J., plurality opinion).
31 Id.
32 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793). See also Field, The Eleventh Amendment and Other
Sovereign Immunity Doctrines: Part One, 126 U. PA. L. REV. 515 (1978) [hereinafter
Field, Part One] ("The one interpretation of the eleventh amendment to which everyone subscribes is that it was intended to overturn Chisholm v. Georgia"); 1 C. WARREN, THE SUPREME COURT IN UNITED STATES HISTORY 96 (1926) (eleventh
amendment was passed in response to Chisholm).
33 C. JACOBS, THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT AND SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY 47 (1972).
The facts of Chisholm v. Georgia were never officially reported but they were circulated in various newspapers. Id.
34 Id.

Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) at 419.
Chisholm, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) at 425-26. See U.S. CONST. art. II1, § 2, cl. 1, supra
note 4. Justice Iredell, in the single dissent, argued that the Court did not establish
jurisdiction directly from the Constitution and nothing in the Judiciary Act suggested that Congress intended to grant the Court jurisdiction over the states. Id. at
432-34 (Iredell, J., dissenting).
37 Welch v. State Dep't of Highways and Pub. Transp., 107 S.Ct. 2941, 2951
(1987) (Powell, J., plurality opinion). See also Marshall, The Diversity Theory, supra
note 5, at 1377-78 ("reaction to Chisholm v. Georgia was 'swift and hostile' "). The
states feared that Chisholm would result in a multitude of suits against the states at a
time when the Union was still trying to organize and when most of the states were
suffering from serious financial problems. C. JACOBS, supra note 33, at 56 (1972); 1
C. WARREN, supra note 32, at 99 (1926).
35
36
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states."8 The haste of the eleventh amendment's enactment,
however, has produced great uncertainty as to the scope of sovereign immunity.3 9 The urgency with which the amendment was
drafted is reflected in its language.4" While the eleventh amendment limits suits brought by out-of-state citizens against a state
based on diversity of state-citizenship jurisdiction, it does not
prohibit claims against a state by its own citizens under federal
question jurisdiction. 4
Nearly a century after the enactment of the eleventh amendment, the Supreme Court confronted the issue left open by the
language of the eleventh amendment-whether a citizen could
sue his home state.4 2 In Hans v. Louisiana, Hans, a citizen of Louisiana, sought to obtain monetary relief in federal court, from the
State of Louisiana for an overdue state-issued bond.4 3 Louisiana
invoked its eleventh amendment immunity in defense of the
claim brought against it by Hans.4 4 Hans argued that claims
brought under the United States Constitution establish federal
question jurisdiction without a need to consider the character of
the parties.45 Hans further argued that the eleventh amendment
does not bar federal question jurisdiction because the explicit
language of the amendment does not prohibit suits between a
state and a citizen of that state.46 Finally, Hans contended that
38 See Marshall, The Diversity Theory, supra note 5, at 1376. See also, Field, Part One,
supra note 32, at 536 (1978) (eleventh amendment was the first time Congress
counteracted a Supreme Court decision by constitutional amendment).
39 Marshall; The Diversity Theory, supra note 5, at 1378. See supra notes 3-5 and
accompanying text. See also Baker, Federalismand the Eleventh Amendment, 48 U. COLO.
L. REV. 139 [hereinafter Baker, Federalism] (the Court has struggled to interpret the
eleventh amendment in manner that preserves federal system); Brown, State Sovereignty Under the Burger Court, supra, note 3, at 366 (eleventh amendment case law is
"unduly confusing and complex"); Fletcher, An HistoricalInterpretationof the Eleventh
Amendment, supra note 4, at 1033 (eleventh amendment is a "baffling" Constitutional
provision); Gibbons, Eleventh Amendment and State Sovereign Immunity, supra note 4, at
1891 ("eleventh amendment today represents little more than a hodgepodge of
confusing and intellectually indefensible judge-made law").
40 Marshall, The Diversity Theory, supra note 5, at 1378.
41 Id. See also Fletcher, A Historical Interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment, supra
note 4, at 1033 (eleventh amendment did nothing to prohibit federal court jurisdiction over suits brought by an in-state citizen against its home state).
42 Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 9 (1890).
43 Id. at 1. The legislative act that authorized the bonds provided that interest
payments would be met through an annual tax levy. Gibbons, The Eleventh Amendment and State Sovereign Immunity, supra note 4, at 2000. After nine years the state
revoked the tax levy and sought to forgive the coupons. Id.
44 See id. at 10.
45 Id. at 9.
46 Id. at 10.
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his claim gave rise to federal question jurisdiction pursuant to the
contract clause contained in article I of the constitution because
the contract clause does not confine its scope to specific parties.4 7
The Hans Court held that the eleventh amendment bars suits
seeking monetary relief from a nonconsenting state by its own
citizens. 48

Although the Court admitted that the eleventh

amendment is ambiguous with regard to whether a state is subject to suit by its own citizens the court resolved that ambiguity
by creating sovereign immunity in this situation. 49 The majority
recognized that although there is no textual support for this type
of immunity, "[i]t is inherent in the nature of sovereignty not to
be amenable to the suit of an individual without [the state's] consent. "50 The Court reasoned that states would not have passed
the amendment had they believed the amendment would permit
their own citizens to bring suits against them. 5 ' The Court fur-

ther reasoned that to allow such suits would encourage out-ofstate citizens who could establish federal question jurisdiction to
thus circumventing
become citizens of the state they wish to sue,
52
immunity.
amendment
eleventh
states'
the
After Hans, this judicial expansion of state sovereign immunity flourished until Parden v. Terminal Railway.5 3 In Parden, a

group of Alabama citizens sued the state of Alabama under the
Federal Employer's Liability Act (FELA)54 to recover damages
47 See id. at 9. See also Fletcher, An HistoricalInterpretationof the Eleventh Amendment,
supra note 4, at 1039. The contract clause states that "[n]o state shall.., pass any
... Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts .. "U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10. Further, article III of the constitution provides that "[t]he judicial power shall extend
to all cases .. .arising under the constitution." Id. at art. III, § 2.
48 Hans, 134 U.S. at 21.
49 See id. at 10-11, 15. The Hans Court did, however, reaffirm that the eleventh
amendment bars suits against a state by a citizen of a foreign state. Id. at 20.
50 Id. at 13 (emphasis omitted). See also Welch v. State Dep't of Highways and
Pub. Transp., 107 S.Ct. 2941, 2952 (1987) (Powell, J., plurality opinion) (Hans
established a broad principle of sovereign immunity).
51 Hans, 134 U.S. at 15. The Court stated that to construe the eleventh amendment as authorizing suits against a state by its own citizen "is an attempt to strain
the Constitution and the law to a construction never imagined or dreamed of." Id.
52 See id. at 10-11.
53 377 U.S. 184 (1964). See also Welch, 107 S.Ct. at 2958 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (noting the aggressive expansion of eleventh amendment sovereign immunity);
Ex Parte New York No. 1, 256 U.S. 490, 497 (1921) (sovereign immunity was extended to admiralty actions); Edelman v.Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 664-65 (1974) (sovereign immunity was extended to equitable relief that resembles damages).
54 Parden, 377 U.S. 184-85. See 45 U.S.C. §§ 51-60 (1982). FELA applies to
states because it encompasses "any common carrier" operating in interstate commerce. Id. at § 51. Section 51 provides compensation for railroad employees injured in the course of employment. Id. Specifically, § 51 provides:
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for personal injuries caused by their employer's negligence at the
state-owned railroad.5 5 The Court found that -the commerce
clause of article I of the Constitution 56 was a specific grant of
legislative power that limits sovereign immunity when states are
involved in interstate commerce.57 Thus, the Court reasoned,
states relinquish their sovereignty when they engage in acts regulated under the commerce clause. 58 Noting that FEIA was en-

acted to confer benefits upon all railroad workers, the Court
stated that to construe FEIA as including a "sovereign immunity
exception" would unfairly preclude railroad workers employed
by a state from recovering damages for injuries sustained during
the course of employment.59 The Parden Court, therefore, held
that Alabama could not assert sovereign immunity as a defense
when it knowingly became involved in a federally-regulated railroad operating in interstate commerce.6 Rather than overrule
Hans, the Court distinguished the instant case, which involved a
federal statute abrogating sovereign immunity, from Hans in
which no such statute existed. 6 '
A decade later, in Employees of the Department of Public Health
Every common carrier by railroad while engaging in commerce between any of the several States or Territories . . . shall be liable in
damages to any person suffering injury while he is employed by such
carrier in [] commerce.., for such injury or death resulting in whole
or in part from the negligence of any of the officers, agents, or employees of such carrier or by reason of any defect or insufficiency, due
to its negligence, in its cars, engines, appliances, machinery, track,
roadbed, works, boats, wharves, or other equipment.
Id. Further, § 56 provides that "[u]nder this chapter an action may be brought in a
district court of the United States...." Id. at § 56.
55 Parden, 377 U.S. at 184-85.
56 Id. at 190-91 (quoting Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat) 1, 196-97
(1824)). The commerce clause provides Congress with the power "[t]o regulate
Commerce ... among the several states. . ." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
57 Parden, 377 U.S. at 192.
58 Id. at 192. In the Court's view, congressional regulation of interstate commerce would be greatly hampered if states did not surrender some degree of sovereiguty. Id.
59 Id. at 190.
60 Id. Parden has often been cited for the proposition that the state constructively waived its immunity when it became involved in interstate commerce. Baker,
Federalism, supra note 41, at 164; Brown, State Sovereignty under the Burger Court, supra
note 3, at 387; Fletcher, A HistoricalInterpretationof the Eleventh Amendment, supra note
4, at 1043.
61 Parden, 377 U.S. at 192. The Court actually reaffirmed the holding in Hans v.
Louisiana that individuals may not sue a state without the state's consent. Id. The
Court determined that when states voluntarily choose to participate in activities
regulated by Congress, they knowingly forego their sovereign immunity defense.
Id.
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and Welfare of Missouri v. Department of Public Health and Welfare of
Missouri 2 state health agency employees sought overtime pay
and liquidated damages pursuant to the Fair Labor Standards Act
(FLSA). 63 The employees, citizens of Missouri, sued the State of
Missouri in federal court for monetary relief.64 The Court held
that Congress, by enacting FLSA, did not abrogate states' eleventh amendment immunity. 65 The Court based its holding on an
analysis of the statutory language of. FLSA, which, according to
the Court, did not constitute "clear language" indicating a congressional intent to abrogate the states' sovereign immunity. 66
The Court in Employees distinguished Parden on- four
grounds. 67 First, the Court stated that railroads are subject to
federal regulation pursuant to the commerce clause, while hospitals are regulated entirely by the state. 6 Next, unlike railroads
that are operated for profit, hospitals are neither operated for
profit nor typically managed by private persons or corporations. 69 Moreover, the employees' only remedy under FELA was
to bring suit for monetary relief, whereas FLSA afforded means
other than employee suits for obtaining monetary relief.7 ° Further, the Court noted that in Parden, the state employees sought
411 U.S. 279 (1973).
Id. at 281. The purpose of FLSA is to regulate working conditions for the
benefit of employees. See 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-19 (1988). Section 216(b) provides that
an action may be brought in "any Federal or State court of competent jurisdiction"
to recover unpaid overtime compensation and liquidated damages. Id. at § 216(b)
(1988).
64 Employees, 411 U.S. at 281.
65 Id. at 285.
66 Id.
67 Id. at 281. Both Parden and Employees involved claims brought by state employees seeking monetary recovery from a state under a federal statute. See supra
notes 53-61 and accompanying text. See also supra notes 62-72 and accompanying
text.
68 Id. at 282. In Employees, the Court never explicitly addressed whether Congress has the power to abrogate sovereign immunity. Id. at 282-83.
69 Id. at 284.
70 Id. at 285. Section 216(c) provides employees a remedy by allowing the Secretary of Labor to file a complaint. 29 U.S.C. § 216(c) (1988). Specifically, § 216(c)
states:
The Secretary [of Labor] is authorized to supervise the payment of
the unpaid minimum wages or the unpaid overtime compensation owing to any employee or employees ... The Secretary [of Labor] may
bring an action in any court of competent jurisdiction to recover the
amount of unpaid minimum wages or overtime compensation and an
equal amount as liquidated damages.
Id. Further, § 216(b) provides that when the Secretary of Labor files a complaint,
the right of an employee to bring a suit under § 216(b) is terminated. Id. at
§ 216(b).
62
63
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only compensatory damages, while in Employees, the petitioners
sought liquidated damages as well as unpaid wages. 7 ' Although
the Parden Court determined that states surrendered part of their
sovereignty when they ratified the commerce clause, the Court in
Employees stated that in regulating interstate commerce, Congress
could only abrogate states' sovereign immunity where such congressional purpose is clear. 2
In 1985, the Supreme Court adopted a stricter test for determining whether Congress abrogated eleventh amendment immunity through its legislative enactments. 73 In Atascadero State
Hospital v. Scanlon,'7 the Court found that "Congress may abrogate the States' constitutionally secured immunity from suit in
federal court only by making its intention unmistakably clear in the
language of the statute."' 75 In Atascadero, a handicapped man

brought suit under section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of
1973.76 He alleged that the Atascadero State Hospital and the
71 Employees, 411 U.S. at 286. The Court was concerned with assessing liquidated damages against the state because it could result in large expenditures of
state funds in order to comply with the statute. Id.
72 Id. at 286-87. Justice Marshall, in his concurring opinion, attempted to distinguish eleventh amendment immunity from common law immunity. Id. at 287 (Marshall, J., concurring). Justice Marshall opined that common law immunity acted as
an absolute bar against suits brought by a citizen against a nonconsenting state. Id.
at 288. Justice Marshall argued that the framers of the constitution intended to
incorporate common law sovereign immunity into article III of the constitution. See
id. at 291-92. According to Justice Marshall, article III bars federal jurisdiction in a
suit between a citizen and a nonconsenting state. Id. Justice Marshall determined
that the proper forum for such a suit would be state court because the doctrine of
common law immunity does not bar suits against a state in state court. Id. at 298
(Justice Marshall has since rejected his own theory in Atascadero State Hospitalv. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 259 (1985)). See supra notes 77-86 and accompanying text.
In his dissent, Justice Brennan (relying on Parden) argued that states, by ratifying the commerce clause, surrendered their sovereign immunity and authorized
Congress to compel a state to appear in federal court. Employees, 411 U.S. at 301.
Justice Brennan also analyzed the controlling statutes in Parden and Employees. Id. at
302. He determined that the intent to abrogate sovereign immunity was considerably clearer in FLSA than in FELA. Id. Justice Brennan asserted that states must
therefore, not be afforded sovereign immunity under FLSA because the language is
not as clear in FLSA as in FELA. Id. Justice Brennan noted, however, that in Parden
the Court found that sovereign immunity was abrogated in FELA. Id. Finally, Justice Brennan argued that Hans was a pure "sovereign immunity" case and should
not be read to extend to article III or eleventh amendment federal judicial powers.
Id. 320-21.
73 Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234 (1985). It is important to
note that the Court in Employees required that Congress indicate its intent to abrogate sovereign immunity through "clear language." Employees, 411 U.S. at 285.
74 473 U.S. 234 (1985).
75 Id. at 242 (emphasis added).
76 Id. at 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1982). Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973
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California Department of Mental Health discriminated against
him by refusing him employment.77
The Atascadero Court held that the eleventh amendment
barred petitioner's claim. 78 The majority reasoned that because
of the unique relationship between the states and the federal
government, 79 an abrogation of eleventh amendment immunity
requires unmistakably clear statutory language.80 Although Congress enacted the Rehabilitation Act pursuant to its fourteenth
amendment powers,8 ' the Court did not perceive the language in
the Rehabilitation Act as evincing an unmistakably clear congressional intent to abrogate sovereign immunity.8 2
In 1987, the Court faced an issue similar to that presented in
Pardens3 and Employees, s4 in Welch v. Texas Department of Highways
and Public Transportation.5 Welch, an employee of the Texas Department of State Highways and Public Transportation, sued the
State of Texas and the State Highway Department to recover
damages for a work-related injury.86 The employee brought suit
in federal court under section 33 of the Jones Act, an act which
incorporates provisions of FELA. s7
provides handicapped persons with protection against employment discrimination
in federally-financed programs. Id.
77 Atascadero, 473 U.S. at 236.
78

Id. at 246.

Id. at 242. The majority quoted Powell's dissent in Garcia v. San Antonio
Metropolitan Transit Authority: "The 'Constitution mandated balance of power'
between the States and the Federal Government was adopted by the Framers to
ensure the protection of 'our fundamental liberties.' " Id. quoting 469 U.S. 528,
572 (1985).
80 Atascadero, 473 U.S. at 242.
81 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5. Section 5 of the fourteenth amendment provides that "Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the
provisions of this article." Id.
82 Atascadero, 473 U.S. at 247.
83 See supra notes 53-55 and accompanying text.
84 See supra notes 65-66 and accompanying text.
85 107 S. Ct. 2941 (1987) (Powell, J., plurality opinion). Welch marks the polarization of the Court on the issue of sovereign immunity and its relationship to federal jurisdiction. See id. The plurality asserted that states are protected from suits
in federal court by a sweeping sovereign immunity doctrine. Id. at 2945 (Powell, J.,
plurality opinion) (citing Pennhurst State School and Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S.
89, 98 (1984)) (states' sovereign immunity implicit in article III bars federal jurisdiction over nonconsenting states). Alternatively, the dissent argued that state sovereign immunity should be narrowly interpreted, thus providing Congress with
broad abrogation powers. See id. at 2958 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Scalia
found absolute state immunity and joined with the plurality. See id. at 2958 (Scalia,
79

J., concurring).
86
87

Id. at 2944 n. 1.
Id. at 2944. See 46 U.S.C. § 688(a) (1988). By incorporating the Federal Em-
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In Welch, a slim majority of the Court held that Congress did
not- abrogate eleventh amendment immunity when they enacted
FELA."8 In so holding, the Court relied on the statutory language of the Rehabilitation Act. 89 The Welch Court did not decide whether Congress actually possesses abrogation powers. 90
Justice Powell, writing for the plurality, stated that the language
of the Jones Act does not rise to the level of an unequivocal expression of congressional intent to abrogate sovereign immunity. 91 Thus, the Court expressly overruled the Parden Court's
finding that the language in FELA was sufficient to abrogate sovereign immunity.92
The plurality reasoned that the eleventh amendment affirms
the fundamental principle that states are immune from suit under
article

111.

93

The plurality believed that the framers of the Con-

stitution were concerned that a sovereign might be sued in another sovereign's court without its consent. 94 The plurality,
echoing the unanimous Supreme Court decision in Hans, 9 5 emphasized the importance of states' sovereign immunity in the federal system. 9 6 Further, the Court stated that case law subsequent

to Hans established a basic framework of federalism in which the
eleventh amendment bars suits against states by native citizens
ployer's Liability Act, the Jones Act allows the provisions of FELA to apply to
seamen. Welch, 107 S. Ct. at 2944. The Jones Act was enacted pursuant to the
commerce clause. See id.
88 Welch, 107 S. Ct. at 2947 (Powell, J., plurality opinion).
89 Id.
90 Id. at 2946 (Powell, J., plurality opinion). It is interesting to note that Parden

is the only case where the Court considered whether Congress actually possesses
abrogation powers. Parden v. Terminal Ry., 377 U.S. 184, 190-91 (1964). See supra
notes 53-61 and accompanying text.
91 Welch, 107 S. Ct. at 2947 (Powell, J., plurality opinion).
92 See id. at 2948 (Powell, J., plurality opinion). In the Court's view, the Parden
Court erred in their interpretation of Congressional intent. Id. Parden required
only that FELA contain language that states were immune from the Act's provisions, rather than an explicit intention to override eleventh amendment immunity
as required by the Court since the Atascadero decision. Id.; see also supra notes 74-75
and accompanying text.
93 See id. at 2945 (Powell, J., plurality opinion).
94 Id. at 2947 (Powell, J., plurality opinion). After extensive historical analysis,
the only determinative statement that Justice Powell could make about the intentions of the Framers and Ratifiers was that they were ambiguous. Id. at 2951 (Powell, J., plurality opinion). Justice Brennan espoused a similar characterization. Id.
at 2964 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
95 Id. at 2952 (Powell, J., plurality opinion). See supra notes 48-52 and accompanying text.
96 Id.
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without a state's consent.9 7
* Writing for the dissent, Justice Brennan argued that eleventh
amendment sovereign immunity only protects a state against
suits brought by citizens of a foreign state where federal jurisdiction is based solely on diversity of citizenship.9" Justice Brennan
stated that because the eleventh amendment is silent with respect
to suits brought against a state by citizens of that state, such a suit
can be brought on the basis of federal question jurisdiction.'
Based on this analysis, Justice Brennan concluded that the decision in Hans to bar a citizen from suing his home state for monetary relief was inappropriately grounded on historical materials
addressing diversity cases rather than federal question cases.1'°
Justice Brennan also argued that Congress is statutorily authorized to abrogate such common law immunity.10 1 Justice Brennan
found that by enacting FELA, Congress abolished state immunity; therefore, the State of Texas should be subject to suit by
0 2
one of its own citizens.1
Eight days before Hoffman was decided, the Court reaffirmed
the Atascadero test; statutory abrogation of eleventh amendment
sovereign immunity requires unmistakably cleat statutory language.' 0 In Dellmuth v. Muth,'014 the Court held that the Education of the Handicapped Act (EHA)' °5 does not abrogate state
sovereign immunity. 10 6 In Dellmuth, the respondent sought, pursuant to EHA, to recover both tuition paid for his handicapped
97 Welch, 107 S. Ct. at 2953 (Powell,J., plurality opinion) (citing Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313 (1934)). Relying on the doctrine of stare decisis, Justice Powell
refuted the argument posited by the dissent that Hans should be overruled. Welch,
107 S.Ct. at 2956-57 (Powell, J., plurality opinion). To support his reliance on
precedent, Justice Powell cited numerous prior decisions in support of Hans. Id. at
2956-57 n. 27 (Powell, J., plurality opinion) (citations omitted).
98 Id. at 2964-65 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan was joined by Justices Marshall, Blackmun and Stevens. Id.
99 Id. at 2965 (Brennan, J., dissenting). See also Field, Part One, supra note 32 at
538 ("[s]overeign immunity survives the adoption of the Constitution, then, but it
is subject to modification or even abandonment by processes short of constitutional
amendment").
100 Welch, 107 S.Ct. at 2965 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
101 Id. at 2969 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
102 Id. Justice Brennan criticized the plurality's interpretation of the framer's intentions and the historical development of the eleventh amendment. Id. at 295870.
103 See Dellmuth v. Muth, 109 S.Ct. 2397, 2402 (1989).
104 109 S.Ct. 2397.
105 Id. at 2398 (citing 20 U.S.C. § 1400 (1982)). The Education of Handicapped
Act seeks to provide free and appropriate public education for handicapped children. ld.
106 Dellmuth, 109 S.Ct. at 2402.
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son's private school education and attorney's fees. 1 0 7 In analyzing the statutory language of EHA, the Court reaffirmed Atascadero by stating that "congressional intent [to abrogate
08
sovereign immunity] must be both unequivocal and textual."'1
The Court determined that legislative history should not be considered in determining whether Congress had intended to abrogate eleventh amendment immunity.' 0 9
It is against this backdrop of eleventh amendment jurisprudence that the Supreme Court decided Hoffman v. Connecticut Department of Income Maintenance."' In Hoffman, the Court was called
upon to determine whether a bankruptcy court is empowered
under section 106(c) of the Bankruptcy Code to render a monetary judgment against a state that fails to file a proof of claim in a
Chapter 7 proceeding."' Section 106(c) provides that, "notwithstanding any assertion of sovereign immunity, a judicial determination of an issue arising under a Bankruptcy Code provision
that contains the words 'creditor', 'entity' or 'governmental unit'
binds governmental units." ' 1 2 In Hoffman, a majority of the court
held that section 106(c) does not abrogate a state's eleventh
3
amendment immunity." 1

In a plurality opinion, Justice White concluded that the language of section 106(c) falls short of an unqualified abrogation of
a state's immunity under the eleventh amendment.' 14 Justice
White recognized that section 542(b), the "turnover" provision,
and section 547(b), the preference provision, are both triggered
under section 106(c)(1) because the sections contain the words
107

Id. at 2399.

108 Id. at 2401.

See also Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 242
(1985). See supra notes 74-82 and accompanying text.
109 Dellmuth, 109 S. Ct. at 2401.
110 109 S. Ct. 2818 (1989).
111 Id. at 2821 (White, J., plurality opinion). Sections 106(a) and (b) are not applicable to petitioner's suit because no proof of claim was filed by the respondents
in the two Chapter 7 proceedings. Id. at 2822 (White, J., plurality opinion). See
supra notes 17-18 and accompanying text.
112 11 U.S.C. § 106(c) (1988). See supra note 7.
113 Hoffman, 109 S. Ct. at 2824 (Rehnquist, White, O'Connor, Scalia, and
Kennedy).
114 Id. at 2822 (White, J., plurality opinion joined by ChiefJustice Rehnquist and
Justices O'Connor and Kennedy) (citing Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473
U.S. 234, 242 (1985)). See also Dellmuth v. Muth, 109 S. Ct. 2397, 2401 (1989)
(Congressional intent to abrogate sovereign immunity must be unqualified and textual); Welch v. Texas Dep't of Highways and Pub. Transp., 107 S. Ct. 2941, 2946
(1987) (Congress must unequivocally express its intention to override States' eleventh amendment immunity in a statute).
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"entity" and "creditor" respectively.' t' Justice White, however,
rejected Hoffman's assertion that any Bankruptcy Code provision
containing such trigger words would defeat a state's sovereign
immunity defense."I 6 Justice White stated that in light of the narrow sovereign immunity waivers provided for in subsections (a)
and (b) of section 106, it is doubtful that Congress intended subsection (c) to act as a sweeping nullification of eleventh amendment immunity."I 7
Justice White stated that subsection 106(c)(2), which subjects governmental units to court judgments, should be read in
tandem with the trigger words of subsection 106(c)(1)."18 Supporting this assertion, Justice White cited the conjunction "and"
which joins clauses (1) and (2) of section (c). " 9 Justice White
reiterated that it was the Court's obligation "to give effect ... to
every clause and word of a statute...'1 20 In analyzing the relationship of subsection (c)(2) to subsection (c)(l), Justice White
noted that subsection 106(c)(2) authorizes a bankruptcy court to
determine issues rather than claims as provided in sections
106(a) and (b).' 2 ' Justice White interpreted the word "claim" as
encompassing monetary judgments, and the word "issue" as re22
lating to determinations which restrict governmental units.'
Further, Justice White distinguished a "claim" from a "determination," in that the latter provides for declaratory and injunctive
relief.' 23 Justice White, therefore, concluded that the operative
language, "determination by the [bankruptcy] court of an issue," ' 12 4 contained in subsection 106(c)(2) suggests declaratory
and injunctive relief rather than monetary recovery. 25 Hence,
115 Hoffman, 109 S. Ct. at 2822 (White, J., plurality opinion).
116 Id.

117 Id. The plurality recognized that § 106(a) permits a waiver of eleventh
amendment immunity only when there is a counterclaim against the governmental
unit. Id. The plurality also noted that under § 106(b), a waiver of sovereign immunity is limited to the offset of the governmental unit's claim. Id.
118

Id.

19 Id. at 2822-23 (White, J., plurality opinion).
120 Id. at 2823 (White, J., plurality opinion) (quoting United States v. Menasche,
348 U.S. 528, 538-39 (1955)).
121 Id. (citing 11 U.S.C. § 101(4)(A) (1988)).
122 Hoffman, 109 S. Ct. at 2823 (White, J., plurality opinion). See 11 U.S.C.
§ 505(a)(1) (1988) ("the court may determine the amount or legality of any tax, any
fine, or penalty relating to a tax, or any addition to tax .....
123 Id.

124 11 U.S.C. § 106(c)(2) (1988).
125 Hoffman, 109 S. Ct. at 2824 (White, J., plurality opinion). See also Neavear v.
Schweiker, 674 F.2d 1201, 1204 (7th Cir. 1982) (sovereign immunity may be
waived to allow bankruptcy courts to determine the dischargeability of debts the
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Justice White, concluded that section 106(c) does not subject 2 a6
state that failed to file a proof of claim to monetary judgments.1
Justice White rejected Hoffman's reliance on legislative history finding it irrelevant in determining whether the statute constitutes an express abrogation of eleventh amendment
immunity. 127 According to Justice White, "[i]f congressional intent is unmistakably clear in the language of the statute, reliance
on committee reports and floor statements will be unnecessary,
and if it is not, Atascadero will not be satisfied."' 128 Justice White
concluded that Hoffman's actions under sections 542(b)
and
1 29
547(b) were barred by eleventh amendment immunity.
In his concurring opinion, Justice Scalia stated that Congress
lacks the power to abrogate eleventh amendment immunity. 3 0
In Justice Scalia's view, Hoffman could not bring suit under the
Bankruptcy Code against his home state for monetary recovery.'' Justice Scalia also reiterated his dissenting position in
Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co.,132 a case decided by the Court on
the same day as Hoffman. 'I In both cases, Justice Scalia argued
that it is inconsistent to allow suits by a citizen against his home
state without that state's consent and empower Congress
with the
4
authority to abrogate that constitutional principle.1
Justice O'Connor filed a separate concurrence wherein she
agreed with Justice Scalia that the bankruptcy clause does not
empower Congress to enact a statute that overrides a state's elevgovernment is owed); Gwilliam v. United States, 519 F.2d 407, 410 (9th Cir. 1975)
(bankruptcy courts able to determine type and amount of taxes due and extent of
liability and indebtedness).
126 Hoffman, 109 S. Ct. at 2823 (White, J., plurality opinion).
127 Id. at 2823-24 (White, J., plurality opinion) (citing Dellmuth v. Muth, 109 S.
Ct. 2397, 2401 (1989)).
128 Id. at 2824 (White, J., plurality opinion) (citing Atascadero State Hosp. v.
Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234 (1985)).
129 Id.
130 Id. (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment).
'3' Id.
132 109 S.Ct. 2273 (1989).
133 Hoffman, 109 S. Ct. at 2824 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment); Pennsylvania, 109 S. Ct. at 2295 (Scalia, J., dissenting). The Supreme Court in Pennsylvania held that the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and
Liability Act subjects states to claims brought by their own citizens in federal court
for monetary relief. Id. at 2286 (majority opinion). The Court further held that
Congress had the power to enact such legislation pursuant to the commerce clause.
Id. at 2286 (plurality opinion).
134 Hoffman, 109 S. Ct. at 2824 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment); Pennsylvania, 109 S.Ct. at 2299 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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enth amendment immunity. 3 5

In a fervent dissent, Justice Marshall Stated that the bankruptcy clause does empower Congress to abrogate eleventh
amendment immunity. 36 Justice Marshall also argued that Congress clearly did so when they enacted section 106(c).'" 7 Thus, in
the dissent's view citizens may sue their home states for monetary
relief. 3 1 Justice Marshall noted that the drafters of section
106(c) were cognizant of the fact that Atascadero requires statutory
language to evidence an unequivocal intent to abrogate sovereign immunity. 3 9 Justice Marshall stipulated that the drafters,
aware of the Atascadero requirement, had carefully abrogated
states' eleventh amendment immunity in three ways.1 40 First,
section 106(c) eliminates the use of a sovereign immunity defense. 14 Second, clause (1) of section 106(c) applies section
106(c) to states by including states in the trigger words found in
other Bankruptcy Code provisions.' 42 Third, clause (2) of section 106(c) binds states to orders promulgated by a bankruptcy
court. 143 Justice Marshall characterized these three steps as evi-

dencing a clear intent on the part of Congress 1to
ensure abroga44
tion of states' eleventh amendment immunity.
Justice Marshall rejected the plurality's interpretation that
135 Hoffman, 109 S. Ct. at 2824 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
136 Id. at 2824-25 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (citing Atascadero State Hosp. v.
Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 242 (1985)). Justice Marshall was joined by Justices Brennan, Blackmun and Stevens.
137 Id.
138 See Hoffman, 109 S.Ct. at 2825 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
139 Id. at 2824-25 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
140 Id. at 2825 (Marshall, J., dissenting). The dissent noted that the plurality incorrectly viewed the three steps as a redundancy in the statute rather than as a clear
expression of congressional intent. Id. Justice Marshall cited support for his proposition by setting out a list of cases and authorities. Id. at 2825 n.1 (Marshall, J.,
dissenting) (citing WJM, Inc. v. Massachusetts Dept. of Pub. Welfare, 840 F.2d 996,
1001 (1st Cir. 1988); McVey Trucking, Inc. v. Secretary of State of Illinois, 812 F.2d
311, 326-27 (7th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 895 (1987); Neavear v. Schweiker,
674 F.2d 1201, 1202-04 (7th Cir. 1982); Rhode Island Ambulance Services, Inc. v.
Begin, 92 B.R. 4, 6-7 (Bankr. RI 1988); Tew v. Arizona State Retirement System, 78
B.R. 328, 329-31 (SD Fla. 1987); cf. Gingold v. United States, 80 B.R. 555, 561
(Bankr. ND Ga. 1987); R & L Refunds v. United States, 45 B.R. 733, 735 (Bankr.
WD Ky. 1985); Gower v. Farmer Home Admin., 20 B.R. 519, 521-22 (Bankr. MD
Ga. 1982): Remke, Inc. v. United States, 5 B.R. 299, 300-02 (Bankr. ED Mich.
1980). He also stated that most lower courts have determined that § 106(c) does
allow for monetary judgments against a state. Id.
141 Id. at 2825 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
142 Id.
143 Id.
144 Id.

106
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section 106(c) is a limited abrogation of sovereign immunity
which applies only to declaratory and injunctive relief rather than
monetary recovery.' 45 He reasoned that it was inappropriate to
analogize the word "determination" in section 106(c)(2) to the
tax section of the Code-section 505(a)(1).

14 6

The analogy was

limited, in Justice Marshall's view, because other sections of the
Code did not confine the meaning of "determination" to declaratory and injunctive relief, but instead authorized "appropriate orders and judgments" to be entered upon a "determination"."'47
Justice Marshall believed the Court should focus on the explicit
statutory language itself rather than analogizing to other provisions to determine whether Congress had abrogated sovereign
immunity. 148
In addition, Justice Marshall also denounced the plurality's
fear that an expansive interpretation of section 106(c) would result in the application of section 106(c) in a "scattershot fashion
to over 100 Code provisions .... ,,
""
Justice Marshall argued that
only a handful of Bankruptcy Code provisions contemplate binding a governmental unit to a monetary judgment. 50 Justice Marshall concluded that Congress intended to include monetary
relief in its clear abrogation of sovereign immunity contained in
section 106(c). 151
Justice Marshall discussed the policy considerations underlying the treatment of states as 'creditors' and 'entities' for purposes of enforcing monetary judgments under limited
Bankruptcy Code provisions. 152 The Justice criticized the majority for undermining these policy goals by treating states as preferred creditors. 5 ' Justice Marshall argued that if states were
subject to the preference provision, states would be prevented
from obtaining money from a financially unstable debtor. 14 JusId.
Id. See 11 U.S.C. § 505 (1988); see infra note 122.
147 Hoffman, 109 S. Ct. at 2825 (Marshall, J., dissenting). In Justice Marshall's
view, defining the word "determine" under 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(1) (1982) is an
equally compelling analogy. Id. Section 157(b)(1) provides that "Bankruptcy
Judges may hear and determine all cases under title 11 ...and may enter appropriate orders and judgments." See 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(1) (1982).
148 Hoffman, 109 S. Ct. at 2825, (Marshall, J., dissenting).
149 Hoffman, 109 S. Ct. at 2826 (Marshall, J., dissenting); see also Kelly v. Robinson, 479 U.S. 36, 43 (1986) (provisions of the code must be read as a whole).
150 Hoffman, 109 S.Ct. at 2826 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
151 Id. at 2827 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
152 Id. at 2826-27 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
153 Id. at 2826 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
154 Id. at 2827 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
145
146
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tice Marshall feared that if the preference provision did not so
apply, states would prematurely coercing unstable debtors into
bankruptcy.' 55 Moreover, non-governmental creditors, fearing
the preferred status of governmental creditors, might also exert
further pressure on debtors.' 56 Justice Marshall stressed that
Congress enacted the turnover provisions, to promote reorganizations or provide for an equitable division of the debtor's
57

estate.1

Finally, the dissent considered whether the bankruptcy
15
clause empowers Congress to abrogate sovereign immunity.
Citing Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., Justice Marshall noted that
Congress has the same authority under the bankruptcy clause as
under the commerce
clause to abrogate the eleventh amendment
59
immunity. 1

Justice Stevens filed a separate dissent in which he set forth
the legislative history of section 106.160 Justice Stevens noted
that after considering a complete waiver of eleventh amendment
immunity, Congress enacted section 106(a) and (b) which limits
eleventh amendment waivers "to compulsory counterclaims and
offsets."'"' Justice Stevens stated that section 106(c) was added
to provide bankruptcy courts with the power to render monetary
judgments against governmental units; such authority, however,
was limited to the Code sections which contain the statutory trigger words in section ' 106(c)(1), i.e., "creditor," "entity," and
"governmental unit.
Justice Stevens stressed that any inconsistency in section 106 can be explained by "[t]he fact that paragraph (c) was added to the bill after paragraphs (a) and (b) had
been reported out of Committee....
155 Id. (citing McVey Trucking, Inc. v. Secretary of State of Illinois, 812 F.2d 311,
328 (7th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 895 (1987)).
156 Hoffrnan, 109 S.Ct. at 2827 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
157 Id. (citing United States v. Whiting Pools, Inc., 462 U.S. 198, 202-03 (1983)).

158

Id.

Id. at 2827 (Marshall, J., dissenting). See Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co. 109
S. Ct. 2273 (1989) (commerce clause empowers Congress to abrogate eleventh
amendment immunity).
160 Id. at 2827 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens was joined by Justice
Blackmun. Id.
161 Id. at 2828 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Justice Stevens noted that the authors of
the Code were uncertain as to the extent of Congress' power to nullify a states'
eleventh amendment immunity, so they enacted the limited waivers in subsections
106(a) and (b). Id. (citing H.R. Rep. No. 95-595, p. 317 (1977); S.Rep. No. 95-989,
p. 29 (1978)).
162 Id.
163 Id.
159

108
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Justice Stevens asserted that waivers of sovereign immunity
should be liberally construed in order to give effect to congressional policy goals. 6 4 Justice Stevens noted that section 106(c)
waives the federal government's sovereign immunity as well as
states' sovereign immunity. 16 5 He reasoned that the federal government falls within the trigger words of section 106(c)(1), therefore section 106(c) applies "notwithstanding any assertion of
sovereign immunity....
Justice Stevens maintained that because waivers of sovereign immunity by the federal government
are historically accorded liberal construction in order to effect
policy goals, waivers against the states should be similarly construed. 1 6 7 Hence, Justice Stevens held that bankruptcy courts are
empowered under section 106(c) to render monetary judgments
against states under the Bankruptcy Code provisions containing
16
any of the trigger words.
Part of the confusion surrounding Congress' ability to abrogate states' sovereign immunity under section 106(c) stems from
the Supreme Court's reliance on the Atascadero test. 16 9 Faced
with the unequivocally clear language rule, the plurality's analysis
of section 106(c) was strictly limited to a study of the statutory
language. In faithfully adhering to this test, however, the plurality contravened the policy goals of the Code by elevating a state
to the level of a preferred creditor. Henceforth, non-governmental creditors are at a disadvantage vis-a-vis their governmental
170
counterpart in a bankruptcy proceeding.
Although the Court is deferential to the plain meaning of the
statute, the Court has often considered legislative history when
construing the meaning of a statute, especially when attempting
17 1
to reaffirm its conclusions as to the meaning of the language.
164

Id. at 2829 (Stevens, J., dissenting).

165

Id.

166
167

Id.
Id.

168

Id.

A strict application of the clear statement rule can lead courts to disallow suits
that Congress intended. Field, The Eleventh Amendment and Other Sovereign Immunity
Doctrines: CongressionalImposition of Suit Upon the States, 126 U. PA. L. REV. 1203, 1273
(1978).
170 "The clear statement rule effectively grants the Supreme Court veto power
over congressional enactments when congressional intent to abrogate states' sovereign immunity is clear but the statute is not absolutely clear." Id.
171 Block-Lieb, Using Legislative History To Interpret Bankruptcy Statutes, RESNICK,
BANKR. PRAC. & STRATEGY
2.01[2]. Professor Block-Lieb stated: "[mi]ore often,
however, courts have reffered to the circumstances of enactment to support, not
contradict, a literal application of a Code provision." Id.
169
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In Hoffman, had the plurality looked beyond the statutory language to the legislative history and congressional purpose of section 106(c), they would have confronted compelling reasons why
section 106(c) was intended to abrogate the states' sovereign immunity. The legislative history specifies that Congress included
the provision in order to comply with the "express waiver" requirement.' 72 In fact, the legislative history of section 106(c) reaffirms Justice Marshall's position that section 106(c) was meant
to subject states to the remedies of any Code provision triggered
by the language of section 106(c)(1) including those remedies
that provide for monetary judgments against the states. For example, the legislative history specifically refers to subjecting
states to section 547(b), thus making states liable for any preferential payments from the debtor.'17 This example indicates congressional intent to authorize monetary judgments against states
under section 547(b) and all other triggered code provisions providing for monetary relief.
More importantly, the Court failed to discuss what limits, if
any, exist with respect to congressional authority to abrogate sovereign immunity. 174 This is a threshold question that should
have been the primary focus of the Court. If Congress is not so
authorized, any subsequent attempt to clarify the language would
be futile. It should be noted, however, that Congress is authorized to enact legislation abrogating a state's eleventh amendment
immunity to provide for monetary judgments against a state
under section five of the fourteenth amendment 175 and under the
commerce clause. 176 There is no reason why the bankruptcy
power, a constitutionally
enumerated power, should be treated
7
differently.

7

Even if Congress were to reconsider drafting abrogation lan172 124 Cong. Rec. H32394 (daily ed. September 28, 1978) (statement of Rep.
Edwards); id. at S32393 (daily ed. October 5, 1978) (statement of Sen. DeConcini)
("The provision [106(c)] is included to comply with the requirement in case law
that an express waiver of sovereign immunity is required in order to be
effective...").
173 See 2 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY
106.04 (1990).
174 124 Cong. Rec. H32394 (daily ed. September 28, 1978) (statement of Rep.
Edwards); id. at S32393 (daily ed. October 5, 1978) (statement of Sen. DeConcini).
t75 Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 457 (1976).
176 Pennsylvania v. Union Gas, 109 S. Ct. 2273, 2284 (1989). In Pennsylvania, the
plurality reasoned that the eleventh amendment refers only to "the judicial power"
which cannot be construed to limit congressional authority. Id. at 2283.
'77 Hoffman v. Conn. Dep't of Income Maintenance, 109 S. Ct. 2818, 2824
(1989) (Scalia, J., concurring); id. at 2827 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Brown, State
Sovereignty Under the Burger Court, supra note 3, at 365.
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guage, the majority's judgment failed to provide useful guidelines to enable drafters to determine what language the Court
would consider to be an explicit abrogation of sovereign immunity. Among the factors that Congress may consider in drafting
such legislation are the underlying policy goals of the Bankruptcy
Code, such as the need to provide for equitable distribution of
assets and the necessity to treat all creditors in a like manner. 178
Given that sovereign immunity results in a grant to the states of
preferred creditor status, failure to enact a statute that explicitly
abrogates state sovereignty would defeat the fundamental goals
of the Bankruptcy Code. 179 Congress should revisit section
106(c) so as to unequivocally abrogate states' eleventh amendment immunity. Such congressional action should be designed
to remedy any ambiguities in the language of section 106(c) as
well as to implement the policy goals of the Bankruptcy Code.
Raquel Smith Colby
178
179

Hoffman, 109 S. Ct. at 2826-27 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
Id

